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Professional Sports Attendance as a Proxy for New Stadium Spillover Benefits
Abstract
One of the most interesting issues in state and local public finance over the last 10-15 years has been the
debate over state and local contributions to professional sports stadiums. Despite a large amount of
empirical evidence indicating that state and local governments receive very little, if any economic benefit
from the stadiums they help build, for some reason they keep building them (Bade, Rosentraub). Much
research has gone into this issue, and essentially the same result was found each time: stadiums are
poor investments for governments.
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Professional Sports Attendance as a
Proxy for New Stadium Spillover Benefits
By Ken Perry
I. INTRODUCTION

O

ne of the most interesting issues in state and
local public finance over the last 10-15 years
has been the debate over state and local contributions to professional sports stadiums. Despite a
large amount of empirical evidence indicating that state
and local governments receive very little, if any economic benefit from the stadiums they help build, for
some reason they keep building them (Bade,
Rosentraub). Much research has gone into this issue,
and essentially the same result was found each time:
stadiums are poor investments for governments.
Good financial investments though, are not the
only things governments spend money on. Certainly
no one would argue that parks are good financial investments for cities, yet they are built. Counties participate in a variety of activities that probably do not
have the financial return of a U.S. Government Bond
or some other form of investment. Very little research
though, has been done evaluating other possible gains
from a new stadium, otherwise called spillover benefits, similar to those coming from a park or other
public goods. This paper attempts to identify and to
a certain degree quantify these benefits through stadium attendance levels, with the hope of giving cities
a way to refute stadiums as being poor investments.
Section two of this paper will explore why stadiums
are bad investments. Section three will examine research to date on this topic. Section four will explain
my theory in attempting to quantify these spillover
benefits and examine my research design. Section
five will present my results. And Section six will conclude the paper and offer any implications it might
have.
II. STADIUMS AS BAD INVESTMENTS
When governments attempt to convince voters
that their area is in need of a new stadium for its professional teams, the most often used reason for the
62
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subsidy is that the new stadium will help the local
economy. The theory is that a new stadium will bring
with it new jobs (through construction and stadium
workers), an increase in tourism, general entertainment spending, and a host of other factors that will
help increase the financial position of the area. Empirical evidence shows this is simply not the case.
Robert Baade, one of the foremost authorities on the economics of professional sports, specifically relating to stadiums, has shown time and again
that professional sports and the places in which they
play have no impact on an area's economy (Baade,
1997). Baade conducted a case study in 1997 regarding the recently built Safeco Field in Seattle, WA.
Using research data compiled by the State of Washington when it considered subsidizing the project, as
well as economic data from Phoenix, AZ (the site of a
recently built similar stadium), Baade was able to show
that by investing the taxpayers money in this stadium
as opposed to other alternative avenues of investment the county gains no economic benefits. Other
rates of return are given, as are three projected rates
for the stadium (optimistic, moderate and pessimistic). All three rates show less than a 2% rate of return
for taxpayers, compared to as much as a 13.5% rate
for the other forms of investment. In addition Baade
points out that if the county were to own the stadium,
as the plan called for, risks would increase as well.
Should the team move, the area would have accepted
a huge cost that would eventually then amount to very
little long-term gain. Clearly then, Baade is able to
show that stadiums simply do not make good economic investments.
III. THEORY
It is clear that stadiums do not provide the
economic windfall that localities would like them to
provide. However, the point is that stadiums are still
being built mostly at taxpayer expense. The question
now is why? One argument is the idea that stadiums
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provide some form of spillover benefit similar to a
park or a zoo. The logic here is that people benefit
from the stadium as a form of entertainment, like they
would if they were to go to the civic opera, or symphony orchestra. Watching a football team, although
certainly different in nature, would provide similar
entertainment benefits.
Looking broadly first, one important theory
on local spending comes from Charles Tiebout (1956).
He argues that cities attempt to reach an optimum
fiscal level, for him this being the maximization of their
optimum size. He feels that governments will attempt
to match the preferences of people with the hope of
achieving their ideal population. People will then find
a city where their utility of government policies is maximized. Applying this to local stadium expenditures, it
seems that those cities with stadiums then, are building them to attract (in most cases) more citizens to
their city, or to meet the preferences of those already
living in the area. Since cost and investment figures
are ignored in his theory, and it is clear that new stadiums do seem to provide some additional utility to the
local area, Tiebout's argument might seem to support
government's subsidizing stadiums. If people did not
want these new stadiums, they would leave cities that
were continuously financing new stadiums for teams,
according to Tiebout.
To apply this theory to a real world situation, let
us examine Seattle, Washington. Recently, the area
of Seattle decided to contribute significantly to the
building of new stadiums for both the Seattle Seahawks
and Seattle Mariners teams. If Tiebout were right,
and people did not want such spending, they should
theoretically leave the area. Of course applying such
theory to the real world is difficult. People do not live
in a vacuum and each decision affects countless others. Certainly it seems plausible that people may not
have agreed with the government's decision to help
the teams but may not leave the area for a variety of
other reasons such as jobs, family, school, etc.
Despite the economic evidence against them,
many sports economists and studies have argued for
such intangible benefits created by stadiums. Despite
the countless evidence he himself has found calling
for an end to stadium subsidizing by state and local
governments, Robert Baade is still able to see a
stadium's intangible benefits. In a 1996 article refit-

ting a paper written in response to something he had
previously written, Baade argues: “The most significant contribution of sports is likely to be in the area of
intangibles. The image of a city is certainly affected
by the presence of professional franchises. Professional sports serve as a focal point for group identification. Sports contests are a part of civic culture.
There may well be a willingness of voters to pay taxes
to subsidize this kind of activity just like there is for
parks and museums.”
Even from a man who is clearly able to see
stadiums as poor governmental investments, we still
see a justification for the subsidizing of stadiums. If
sports and conduits of sport such as stadiums, are
considered part of the civic culture, some justification
can be made for the public funding of them. Certainly
other portions of civic culture such as parades, fairs,
performances and displays are financed by the government. Justifying a stadium in this sense then, seems
reasonable as well. Furthermore, if these stadiums
serve some role in group identification, this only furthers such a justification for stadium expenditure.
Regardless, Baade, one of the foremost authorities
on the topic, seems to feel that stadiums do provide
some form of spillover benefits to the community.
Others have even attempted to identify and
quantify these benefits in the form of an empirical study.
The first was published in 1998 by Mark Rosentraub
and David Swindell, two other leading authorities on
stadium financing. They conducted a survey in which
they set out to quantify these spillover benefits. In
addition to the survey, their paper also explains some
theory regarding these spillover benefits. Rosentraub
and Swindell argue that many intangible benefits can
be brought to a city by a new stadium. They see an
increase in a city's image, coming from a high-profile
team or sporting event like the Super Bowl. They
talk of a celebratory benefit to even those non-fans
should teams win a championship or find great success. Essentially, they feel that in a culture where
sports play a huge role, teams create a level of civic
pride for the area. Such contributions to the quality
of life in a given area seem to justify governments paying for athletic facilities.
They also are able to justify public spending
on stadiums in terms of professional sports not necessarily beomg a public good, like a park or national
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defense, but something more along the lines of a "toll"
good. In essence, Swindell and Rosentraub point
out that, although games can be considered a form of
joint consumption (all can watch without hurting others enjoyment), stipulations can be put on the good
to charge viewers to see the product. For those attending the game it is the price of the ticket and for
those watching on television or listening to the radio,
their "fee" is the commercials which are a portion of
the broadcast. This fee, be it in ticket price or in
dealing with commercials is the "toll" consumers are
then forced to pay. Despite this toll however,
Rosentraub and Swindell feel that if spillover benefits
can be generated by teams and, in effect, stadiums,
justification can be found for supporting teams through
tax dollars.
With that, they conducted a telephone survey
of 1,536 citizens of Indianapolis in 1996. They attempted to measure "cultural identity and civic pride”
associated with local teams, sporting events such as
the Indianapolis 500, and other local points of interest. Top responses included the two professional
teams, the NFL's Colts and NBA's Pacers, with the
top response being the Indianapolis 500. In addition
they were also able to show a strong correlation between attending the events and amount of civic pride
associated with a city. Their findings lead them to
make the statement that "Sports teams are clearly critical in establishing the sense of pride respondents have
in living in Indianapolis" (Swindell & Rosentraub,
1998).
Such a statement leads one to believe that
spillover benefits might exist from professional sports.
Although I may not necessarily agree with their definition of professional sports as a toll good, I do feel
their argument regarding spillover benefits is highly
significant. It seems that the majority of costs they
identify, in terms of those viewing the game, seem to
come in the form of advertising on television or radio.
In my opinion, neither provides little if any costs to
the consumer, especially when considering that consumers can merely leave the room or change the channel. With such little costs imposed on those watching
the game, is it still fair to argue that these costs even
exist?
Another study attempting to identify the
spillover benefits created by athletics was done in
64
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1997. Bruce Johnson attempted to capture the public value of the University of Kentucky Wildcats Men's
Basketball by means of a contingent valuation method
(CVM) approach. The CVM approach is commonly
used when measuring the value of environmental
projects. Such an approach is able to capture both
non-use value (those not attending the games but concerned nonetheless) and use values (those actually
attending the games). Non-use was captured by identifying those who "talked about games or read or listened to results and commentary about them in newspapers, on the radio, etc" (Johnson & Whitehead,
2000). What Johnson found was not surprising.
Of the 230 returned surveys out of the 500+
sent out, only 7.4% claimed to have never watched a
game. Furthermore, approximately 88% professed
to be at least casual fans of the Wildcat program. In
addition, almost half believed the quality of life in
Kentucky would decrease without the team. Even
ignoring the probable selection bias that such a mailin survey would create, such results are hard to ignore. Clearly, this team plays a huge role in the community.
Johnson next attempts to place a value on
these benefits by asking how much each respondent
would be willing to spend on building a new stadium
for the team. His results seem, like most attempts to
value a public good, undervalued. This undervaluing,
caused by a phenomenon known as the "free rider,"
occurs when consumers of a good, in this case UK
basketball, think that regardless of how much they
spend to buy/keep the good, others will pay the difference. As a result each person surveyed will undervalue the good, thus underestimating the good's
true worth.
Perhaps the most important theoretical work
done on stadium financing by state and local governments was done by Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000).
They argue that stadiums do in fact provide spillover
benefits for their community. As the authors see it,
stadiums and the teams that play in them "create external benefits for local residents". Some of these
benefits include, giving a city "major league" status,
creating an incentive for the team to continue performing well, and making the team less likely to stay
in the community. But perhaps the most important
argument is in regards to the way these benefits in
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part amass: "...there are direct benefits that accrue to
hometown fans who attend games" (101). Such logic
is essentially the foundation for this research. By assuming these benefits accrue through attendance,
measuring the change in attendance can in some way
quantify these benefits.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
These theories all seems to point to the idea
that stadiums do in fact provide some form of spillover
benefits for local citizens. People seem to benefit in
some way from the existence of professional teams.
Furthermore, it also seems clear that citizens benefit
from a new stadium being built as well. It seems fairly
certain that we have been able to identify that these
benefits do in fact exist. The problem though, is in
attempting to assign a value to these benefits. To date,
no study has really attempted to quantify these benefits. Such is the goal of this research.
By examining attendance levels at both the
old stadium and new stadium, it seems that we would
be able, in part, to see how people value the new
stadium. If attendance levels significantly increase,
people are making the decision to attend the game as
opposed to some other activity they may have chosen otherwise. It is this change that is significant. For
if a person chooses to go to a ball game on a Saturday night instead of the theatre, that person feels he is
better off as a result of watching the game compared
to attending the play. If his decision before the new
stadium was the play, and now it is the game, and the
only thing that changes is the stadium, it seems plausible then that it is the stadium itself that is making this
person better off. It is my contention that these new
stadiums do provide some form of spillover benefit
and that as a result the surrounding area is better off.
People could be doing otter things and spending their
leisure budgets elsewhere (movies, museums, etc.)
like they were before the stadium was built. Now they
are not. Theoretically, this is because their preferences led them to this new stadium.
To test this theory, all '20 professional sports
teams in the National Basketball Association (NBA).
National Football League (NFL) National Hockey
League (NHL) and Major League Baseball (MLB)
have been examined. Despite the research implications of this study dealing primarily with state and lo-

cal funding of stadiums, it seems reasonable that only
using publicly funded stadiums would not be necessary. Regardless of how each stadium is funded, the
new stadium should provide the same spillover benefits. The only difference then, is how these benefits
were paid for. In addition to including both government and non-government funded stadiums, in order
to increase the number of cases. The teams themselves became the unit of analysis, and not the stadium. The reason for this is that some teams, such as
the Chicago Bulls and Blackhawks play in the same
stadium, and theoretically, should then provide the
same spillover benefits. Again, to increase our
caseload, each team is treated individually, almost as
if they played in two separate stadiums. The idea
here being that if the other team did not play in the
stadium, the stadium would still be providing benefits
to the community.
For each team, the opening date of the stadium currently being played is identified, and the attendance level data (per year) for the five years prior
to completion of the stadium and five years after is
used. NFL, and NHL data was compiled from a comprehensive website for stadiums, www.ballparks.com.
NBA data was found at the official NBA website
www.nba.com. MLB data was taken from the 2000
edition of The Sporting News Complete Baseball
Record Book. An average for the five-year periods
was taken and a composite number far both before
the stadium and after the stadium was created. For
cases that do not have five years of data for both
periods, the data available was averaged. For example, if a team's stadium was built in 1997, only
three seasons have been played since the stadium's
opening. As a result, only those three years are averaged.
Of the 120 teams, 67 have been included in
the study. The other 53 that were lost were mostly
NHL and NFL teams playing in stadiums built early
on in the century. It is unknown as to whether attendance figures exist for this time-period in these leagues,
or simply if this data is unavailable.
These composite averages were compared
using the differences of means test to see if the differences between the two averages (pre and post stadium) were statistically significant, by taking into account the standard deviations of the sets of cases, as
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well as the number of cases in each set (Mansfield,
ered to have been built before the stadium boom
1994). Four comparisons were made as follows in
started in the 1980's. Modem stadiums are considorder to partially control for some of the other factors
ered to have been built after 1980. It should also be
affecting sporting attendance:
noted here again, that a majority of data regarding the
OVERALL. The entire pool of 67 teams with
NHL and NFL, especially in the early time period is
attendance figures were first taken and tested. This is
not available, thus significantly lowering the number
the initial test to identify if the theory in general is to
of cases in that category.
hold.
TEAMS SUCCESS. Denunert (1973) found
SPORT. After collecting the data, it became
a significant relationship between a team's success and
apparent that huge discrepancies exist between sports.
attendance levels, leading one to believe that a team's
For example, baseball plays 100+ games while footperformance may affect an attempt to measure these
ball plays 16. Basketball stadiums can hold roughly
spillover benefits. To control for this, each team's
20,000 fans, while a football stadium can hold well
winning percentage for the years in question was
over 50,000 people. Baseball and football are played
found, and averaged to create an index, just like the
primarily outdoors, where fans must endure the
one for attendance. Teams were then put into one of
weather. Hockey and basketball are played indoors,
four groups: teams that were winners both in the old
where the weather will probably not keep people
stadium and the new, teams that were losers in both
away. As a result, it seemed necessary to control for
the old and new stadiums, teams that won in the old
these differences. For this comparison, the 67 teams
but not in the new stadium, and teams that lost in the
were split into their four respective leagues, NBA,
old and won in the new stadium. Teams were deNHL, NFL, and MLB, and the averages were comfined as to be a "winning team" if their percentage
pared for each sport.
was over .500, and a "losing team" if they were under
YEAR. Another possible factor in stadium
.500. Again, the averages between these were comattendance levels is the time period in which the stapared in each group to see if the differences in averdium opened. Professional sports have grown over
age attendance levels were still significant.
the last 100 years to become one of the most promiAssuming all four tests show the differences
nent factors in our society. Because of this growth,
in attendance to be significant in the positive directhere may be differences in attendance levels when
tion, it would seem that the idea that stadiums proBoston's Fenway Park opened in the early 1900's is
vide some sort of spillover benefit may he enhanced
compared to Chicago's New Comisky Park which
to a certain degree.
opened in 1991. Furthermore, spending and economic levels certainly were different as time went on
V. RESULTS
as well. This leads one to believe that the time period
The results of the first differences in means
in which a stadium opened may have played a role as
test were essentially as expected. The results cast be
well. Also, the media's portrayal of both professional
found in Table 1. Even without the statistical test, it is
sports, and the stadium has changed over time, anclear that some difference can be found. An almost
other possible fac300,000 average
Table 1: Results of Differences of Means Test 1
tor pointing to a
person difference
difference in time
seems to tell a sigComparis on 1:
Ne w
periods. To examnificant portion of
Old Stadium
Ove rall
Stadium
ine this phenomthe story. It is clear
enon, the 67 cases
that something is
Difference:
M e an:
798,658
1,093,018
were broken down
affecting behavior
294,359
into two time periin a fairly large
Standard
566,887
816,843
ods, early and
way. Looking at
De viation
modern. Early stathe results of the
Critical Re s ult 2.37*
diums are considdifference of
66
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Table 2: Results of Difference of Means Test 2
Bas e ball (21 Cas e s )

Old Stadium

Ne w Stadium

Mean:

1,345,500

1,965,618

Standard Deviation

701,539

930,25 5

Difference: 620,118

Critical Result

2.44*

Difference: 136,647

Bas ke tball (21 Cas e s )
Mean:

5 3 5 , 3 16

671,963

Standard Deviation

184,218

185,347

Critical Result

2.40*

Football (6 Cas e s )
Mean:

392,80 9

531,826

Standard Deviation

81,702

33,62 5

Critical Result

3.85**

Difference: 139,017

Hocke y (16 Cas e s )
Mean:

578,76 1

710,814

Standard Deviation

113,284

79,780

Critical Result

3.81***

Difference: 132,053

*Significant at 95% Confidence Interval
**Significant at 98% Confidence Interval
***Significant at 99% Confidence Interval

means test, this difference can be explained more
readily. As Table 1 points out, a Critical Result of
2.37 leads to a significance at the 95% Confidence
Interval, meaning that there is a 95% chance that the
difference between the means is statistically significant. This seems to lend a fair amount of credibility
that a new stadium makes a difference inattendance
figures, and seems to support Swindell and Rosentaub
(1998), as well as Baade (l996) who argue that
spillover benefits from teams and stadiums attendance
figures, and seems to support Swindell and Rosentaub
(1998), as well as Baade (l996) who argue that
spillover benefits from teams and stadiums do exist.
The results of the second difference of means
test, controlling for sport can be found in Table Two.
The results of the second test once again show

a high degree of confidence in the difference between
the means. For all four sports we are able to argue
with a high degree of probability that the differences
of means is significant. As can be seen in the table,
baseball and basketball are significant at the 95%
confidence interval while football is significant at the
98% and hockey is significant at the 99%.
The results of the third test does not lend the
support of the first two. These results, controlling for
the year each stadium was built, can be found in Table
3.
As Table 3 shows, the Critical Results from
the differences of means tests controlling for the year
the stadium was built are not as high, statistically compared to what was found in the previous tests. Perhaps this shows that the year stadium was built, and
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Table 3: Results of Differences of Means Test 3

Stadiums Prior to
1990(22 Cas e s )
Mean:
Standard Deviation
Critical Result
Stadiums Afte r
1990(42 Cas e s )
Mean:
Standard Deviation
Critical Result

Old Stadium

Ne w Stadium

813,700
522,27 9
1.83**

1,203,126
854,02 8

Difference: 389,426

790,78 0
594,895
1.59*

1,035,343
801,105

Difference: 244,563

*Significant at 80% Confidence Interval
**Significant at 90% Confidence Interval
Table 4: Results of Differences of Means Test 4

Los e rs /Los e rs (24
Cas e s )

Old Stadium

Ne w Stadium

Mean:

573,04 0

797,33 5

Standard Deviation

223,143

3 8 5 , 4 17

Critical Result

2.46*

Difference: 224,294

Los e rs /Winne rs (11
Cas e s )
Mean:

890,46 8

1,298,211

Standard Deviation

631,143

1,000,400

Critical Result

1.42

Difference: 507,742

Winne rs /Los e rs (9
Cas e s )
Mean:

792,30 9

905,74 4

Standard Deviation

558,773

762,47 7

Critical Result

.360

Difference: 113,435

Winne rs /Winne rs (16
Cas e s )
Mean:

1,021,763

1,364,256

Standard Deviation

763,60 0

1,001,321

Critical Result

1. 2 3

*Significant at 95% Confidence Interval

68

The Park Place Economist / vol. IX

Difference: 342,493

Professional Sports Attendance as a Proxy for New Stadium Spillover Benefits
the time period being considered does in fact play a
role in the differing attendance levels. Another possibility might be the way the data set was split. It was
thought that by finding a near symmetrical split to the
data would be best in that the number of cases in
each set would be somewhat the same. By doing this
though, the cutoff year was pushed later on in the
century, primarily because the majority of the data set
comes from the 1980's and 1990's. Using an earlier
year as the cutoff, possibly near the middle of the
century, may alter the findings significantly.
The results of the fourth control, teams levels
of success, can he found in Table 4.
The results of the fourth control, those dealing
with a team's level of success, specifically controlling
by a team's winning percentage before and after the
stadium, are clearly the least supportive test to the
idea that stadiums might provide public benefits to
communities. Only one of the four groups, the one
dealing with losing teams both before and after stadium completion showed a high confidence interval,
its being 95%. The other three tests, as shown in the
table, were not significant at any level.
Findings from this test may lead to various
conclusions. First of all, it seems natural that the unsuccessful teams would increase attendance. For if a
team were unsuccessful, most people would not want
to go see them play. However, if that team were to
get a new stadium, people might want to go and see
the building. In that type of situation, the only thing
that would drive up attendance would be the new
stadium. It is unclear though as to why the other three
groupings in this test did not show any significant
changes in attendance. When examining the descriptive statistics, table 4 shows that all three have very
high standard deviations, which probably accounts
for the for the low critical results, since differences
between the means remains relatively the same. In
addition, all four tests have a low numbers of cases,
which drops the critical result as well. Furthermore,
the huge differences between the sports pointed out
before, are once more not controlled thus skewing
the data again, especially the standard deviations. With
such a small number of cases, those differences in
sports attendance levels is magnified even more, which
is probably why it was not picked up in the overall
test and time period test.

Of course, it should be once again pointed
out that this is not the entire set of cases, but merely
as complete a set as could be put together. However, it should also be noted that in only three instances
did attendance levels actually decrease when a team
changed venues, Boston's Fenway Park in 1912,
Seattle's Key Arena built in 1983, and Chicago's
Wrigley Field which opened in 1914.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As these difference of means tests show, the
opening of a new stadium appears to have a statistically significant impact on attendance levels. Some
further points however, need to be made.
First, it should he noted that the number of
cases is a little more than half of the entire population
of major professional teams in he U.S. and Canada.
Although there is no reason to believe that this section of data is not representative of the entire population, it still should be noted that this is not a complete
picture being examined. It is merely as much of the
picture as is available to us. Second, it should also be
noted hat this increase in attendance is not a clear
definitive argument for the increase in spillover benefits from a new stadium. Attendance is only being
used as a proxy for these benefits, based in part on
theory from Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), which
may or may not be representative of the benefits attempting to be measured. It would also be useful to
run the same tests, using some level of radio or television viewers, however data for such an examination
was not available. However, the results of this research do seem to support Baade (1996), Johnson
and Whitehead (2000), and Swindell and Rosentraub
(1998) in that it seems to argue that people seem to
at least think of themselves as better off for going to
these stadiums as opposed to somewhere else. It
may also lend some support to Tiebout (1956) in that
communities may actually want these stadiums, again
because they feel they are better off for having them.
Finally, it is also important to point out that
this paper has not been able to show that stadiums
are to be considered sound financial investments.
Merely, it has shed some further light on the idea that
an increase in public utility may come from the building of a new stadium, similar to the increase seen if a
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new park or zoo is constructed. It suggests to local
governments who may be considering building a new
stadium, that they must look beyond the numbers and
see if a new stadium might be able to increase civic
pride, public morale, or some other aspect of society.
It also points to the idea that Cost/Benefit analysis
which attempts to numerically value a new stadium
project may not be enough. Cost/Benefit analysis
may ignore a significant portion of the benefits and
civic good the stadium can provide. This does not
however mean that stadiums can now be considered
sound investments. This is not the scope of the work.
Merely, this research is pointing to the idea that more
needs to be considered when deciding whether or
not a stadium should be built.
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